Wong on Civil Liability

Road Traffic, Rules & Offences

Work-in-progress, 20 April 2025 (last updated)

[A] Road Rules

[A.1] Western Australia, Sources: see Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA); "highway code": Road Traffic Code 2000 (WA); Roadworthiness: Road Traffic (Vehicles) Regulations 2014 (WA).

[A.2] Requirement to report to police after accident occasioning bodily harm or property damage above a certain threshold: see Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) s 56. 

[B] Yellow lights, Qld

• Transport Operations (Road Use Management—Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Q), reg 57 <https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/sl-2009-0194#sec.57>: "57 Stopping for a yellow traffic light or arrow (1)A driver who is approaching, or at, traffic lights showing a yellow traffic light— (a)must stop— (i)if there is a stop line at or near the traffic lights and the driver can stop safely before reaching the stop line—as near as practicable to, and before reaching, the stop line; or (ii)if there is no stop line at or near the traffic lights and the driver can stop safely before reaching the traffic lights—as near as practicable to, and before reaching, the nearest traffic lights; or (iii)if the traffic lights are at an intersection and the driver can not stop safely under subparagraph (i) or (ii), but can stop safely before entering the intersection—before entering the intersection; and (b)must not proceed until the traffic lights— (i)change to green or flashing yellow; or (ii)show no traffic light. Maximum penalty—20 penalty units. (2)A driver who is approaching, or at, traffic arrows showing a yellow traffic arrow, and turning in the direction indicated by the arrow— (a)must stop— (i)if there is a stop line at or near the traffic arrows and the driver can stop safely before reaching the stop line—as near as practicable to, and before reaching, the stop line; or (ii)if there is no stop line at or near the traffic arrows and the driver can stop safely before reaching the traffic arrows—as near as practicable to, and before reaching, the nearest traffic arrows; or (iii)if the traffic arrows are at an intersection and the driver can not stop safely under subparagraph (i) or (ii), but can stop safely before entering the intersection—before entering the intersection; and (b)must not proceed until the traffic arrows— (i)change to green or flashing yellow; or (ii)show no traffic arrow. Maximum penalty—20 penalty units. (3)If the traffic lights or arrows are at an intersection and the driver can not stop safely under subsection (1) or (2) and enters the intersection, the driver must leave the intersection as soon as the driver can do so safely. Maximum penalty—20 penalty units. (4)If there is a bicycle storage area before any traffic lights referred to in subsection (1) or (2), a reference to the stop line in subsection (1)(a) or (2)(a)— (a)in the case of a driver of a motor vehicle (other than a motorbike), is a reference to the first stop line that the driver comes, or came, to in approaching the lights; or (b)in the case of a rider of a bicycle, a personal mobility device or a motorbike, is a reference to the stop line that is nearest to the intersection."

> Schedule 5, Dictionary: 

-> "enter, an intersection or crossing, for the driver of a vehicle or a train, means enter the intersection or crossing with any part of the vehicle or train."

-> "intersection means the area where 2 or more roads (except any road-related area) meet, and includes— (a)any area of the roads where vehicles travelling on different roads might collide; and (b)the place, other than a road-related area, where a slip lane between the roads meets the road into which traffic on the slip lane may turn."

-> "red traffic light means an illuminated red disc"

-> "yellow traffic light means an illuminated yellow disc"

-> "traffic lights means a device designed to show a traffic light, or 2 or more traffic lights in a vertical arrangement and at different times, and includes any traffic arrows installed with or near the device."

-> "stop, in part 12 and for a driver, includes park, but does not include stop to reverse the driver’s vehicle into a parking bay or other parking space."

• Query, whether at all material times while approaching or at the traffic lights, the light was yellow or red -- this determines what would be an appropriate charge, and whether reg 56 or 57 would apply. 

• Stancombe v Commissioner of Police (No 2) [2020] QDC 173: "32. The learned Magistrate was satisfied that at approximately 8:30 am on 18 March 2016 the appellant was the driver of a black Mitsubishi vehicle heading along Morayfield Road in a northerly direction when she came upon the intersection of Morayfield Road with Esme Street and Elliot Street. He found that she was approaching traffic lights showing a yellow traffic light. He was satisfied that there was a stop line near the traffic lights. He found beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant could stop safely before reaching that stop line and did not stop as near as practicable to but before the stop line. He was further satisfied that the prosecution had negatived beyond reasonable doubt any exculpatory provision raised on the evidence. He found the appellant guilty. ... 54. The evidence the appellant gave at the trial when asked “what was the lights when you entered the intersection?” was “it was – it was basically green”.   She went on to say “I slowed right down and then I’m already in the intersection. Okay.  I noticed the lights change then to an orange.  I had to leave the intersection because it wouldn’t be safe not to leave the intersection.”  55. The appellant’s evidence is contrary to the account given by her at the scene of the incident.  She clearly stated multiple times that she thought that the light was orange when she proceeded through it.  At no time did she give any indication that she had entered the intersection on a green light, that the lights then turned orange and then she left the intersection.  The account the appellant gave in evidence does not allow for the evidence of either Officer Turner or Officer Greg who both saw the appellant’s car in the intersection when the lights were red.  The account the appellant gave in evidence gives the appearance that it has been reconstructed.  It is unsurprising that the learned Magistrate rejected the account given by the appellant at trial. I too consider it ought to be rejected. 56. However, rejecting the appellant’s account of the event given at trial does not mean that I should automatically leap to a conclusion that she is guilty.  I find, consistent with the account that the appellant gave at the scene, that she was driving slowly towards the green light and it changed to yellow.  She continued to drive slowly such that when the lights changed from yellow to red her vehicle was positioned with the front wheels over the stop line.  Her vehicle had not entered the intersection. 57. Given that the traffic on all accounts was moving slowly there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that it was unsafe for the appellant to have stopped when the light changed to yellow prior to her reaching the stop line.    I am satisfied therefore that she could stop safely before the stop line but did not do so.  She continued to drive the car into and through the intersection."

• R v Laurence [2020] NSWDC 581: "2. The crucial question in the case was whether the appellant could have stopped safely before reaching the stop line. ... 6. The appellant was travelling westbound on Park Avenue which joins at a T junction with the Pacific Highway, running north-south. He turned right into the Highway, northbound. This road junction is controlled by a traffic light which was certainly red (against him) when he was in the intersection. One of the questions in dispute is whether it showed yellow before he came to the stop line and, if so, for how long. The appellant was familiar with the area and this junction and had been working nearby for a few days. Just before the junction on the south side of Park Avenue there is a T junction with Wade Lane which is about 40 m short of the junction with the Highway. Wade Lane runs north/south and is used as a “rat run” for traffic heading to the Highway. Just east of Wade Lane and on the opposite side of the road is the driveway where police cars, including Highway Patrol vehicles, exit Gordon Police Station. ... 12. It is common ground that the appellant did not stop at the yellow light. The learned Magistrate was satisfied, and clearly there was a proper basis for so doing, that the yellow/red light phase was 4 seconds. Her Honour also accepted that the appellant was distracted by the vehicle at the intersection of Wade Lane and Park Avenue. She said that the evidence of the appellant was that he was surprised by the vehicle moving forward. However, he had not actually said this, he said he seen the car as he came to the intersection and had been (in effect, momentarily) distracted. Perhaps more significant, is her Honour’s conclusion that the light was not green when the appellant approached Wade Lane. Although she did not explain this conclusion, I take it from her Honour’s earlier reference to the phase, that the combination of speed, distance and time established that he noticed the intruding vehicle when the light was already yellow and when he had time to stop. Her Honour referred to the ladder on the top of the vehicle as being a reason given by the appellant for deciding it was dangerous to attempt rapid braking and, reasoning that he should have ensured it was securely fastened and not at risk of dislodgment if he stopped suddenly, she concluded, in effect, he did not need to worry about an emergency stop. I have set out the evidence of the appellant in this respect above. There is no reference to a ladder. At all events, the question is not whether he had the duty to ensure a ladder was properly secured but whether it in fact was at risk of dislodgment were he to stop suddenly. In substance, his evidence was that he had been “trained” by his experience not to stop suddenly, hence his decision not to do so. He said he was carrying heavy lead flashing. This would have added significantly to the weight of the vehicle. 13. Another difficulty with the reasoning of the learned Magistrate is her Honour’s description of the issue of not stopping because it was not safe to do so as a “defence”. Her Honour’s approach to this question was, to my mind, that it was for the appellant to establish that he was unable to stop safely, in effect, reversing the onus of proof. In my opinion, it is for the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that, in the circumstances, it is safe for a driver to stop when the light is yellow. At all events, in the present case, the learned Magistrate’s misapprehension of the appellant’s evidence was a significant error. 14. Making every allowance for the advantage of the learned Magistrate in hearing the witnesses, and, in particular, that of the appellant in respect of whom her Honour made an adverse credit finding, I have come to the view that the appeal should be allowed and the appellant acquitted. 15. The distances and speeds involved here make potentially significant an error even of less than a second in the officer’s measurement of the phase. It is notorious that, where events are happening quickly, as was certainly the case here, accurate perceptions of distance and time are likely to be susceptible of significant error. Given the range of relevant factors here, even a relatively slight error in one or more could well be significant. There is also validity in the submission made on the appellant’s behalf that the distance to the lights was less than that measured by the officer. It is also necessary to factor into the technical data the distraction time when the appellant saw the car in Wade Lane, the time it took for his decision about it and the time he took to decide whether it was safe for him to stop sharply. These matters appear to have been ignored. They certainly, for understandable reasons, are not taken into account by the technical data. Furthermore, the data were not based on the actual physical parameters of the appellant’s vehicle which qualified their suitability for the precise calculations upon which the prosecution case depends. Lastly, the question of safe stopping is a matter of judgment that is inherently uncertain, in which the opinion of the driver, especially of a vehicle that requires some experience different from the conventional, is of significance, even if it is not determinative. 16. I have concluded that it was reasonable for the appellant to consider the potential risk presented by the vehicle in the side road and I accept his evidence that his assessment of safety was informed by his experience and was reasonably open to him. It follows that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offence charged."

• Le Poidevin v Police [2005] SASC 314: "16. The Magistrate was also correct in concluding that r 59(1) of the ARR imposes an obligation which is absolute. Proof by the prosecution of an intention on the part of the driver at the relevant time is not an element of the offence. The obligation not to enter an intersection at which a red light is showing is not made subject to any qualification such as " without reasonable cause ". Consideration of the purpose and context of r 59, and of authority, support the conclusion that the obligation is absolute. Part 6 of the ARR, of which r 59 forms part, should be regarded as establishing a scheme as to the obligations of a driver when confronted with traffic lights showing yellow or red. 3 Rule 56 of the ARR specifies the place at or before which a driver of a vehicle approaching traffic lights showing a red traffic light must stop and provides that the driver must not proceed past that point until the traffic lights indicate that it is permissible to do so. Rule 57 governs the obligations of the driver approaching traffic lights showing a yellow traffic light. It provides (relevantly): ... 17. The obligations imposed by r 57 are subject to the qualification in r 57(3), that if the driver is not able to stop safely in accordance with the obligations contained in sub- rules (1) and (2) and enters the intersection, the driver must leave the intersection as soon as the driver can do so safely. Rule 58 provides for a circumstance in which a driver does not have to stop at a red light, namely, where there is, at the same time, a green turn arrow. It is to be observed that the obligations contained in r 59 are not subject to any qualification of the kind contained in r 57(3). 18. It should be accepted that the purpose of r 59, and indeed the ARR generally, is to promote public safety. The risk of collision and consequent injury or damage as a result of vehicles entering intersections against a red light is obvious. The purpose of r 59 is to reduce, if not to eliminate, that risk. Statutes whose purpose is the safeguarding of the public by prohibiting certain acts are commonly construed as imposing obligations which are absolute. 4 19. It is not uncommon for an obligation such as that imposed by r 59 of the ARR to be construed as absolute. The decisions in August v Fingleton 5 , Franklin v Stacey 6 , SA Police v Oakes 7 , and Vandenbergh v Police 8 provide examples.... 20. Prior to 1999, the obligation on a driver to stop at a red traffic light was contained in s 75(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) and reg 3.01 of Regulations made pursuant to that Act. In Strawinski v Hoffrichter[9], Mitchell J construed s 75 as creating an absolute obligation. The Magistrate regarded that decision as being equally applicable to r 59 of the ARR. In my opinion, he was correct to do so. I note that Strawinski v Hoffrichter was referred to with approval in the later cases of Schmalkuche v Williams[10] and Thomas v Jakacic[11]. ... 21. Finally, I note that in SA Police v Oakes Perry J referred with approval to the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Kurtzman[12] in which it had been held that the offence of failure to comply with traffic lights was an offence of absolute, rather than strict, liability, and that “due diligence” was no defence.[13]  This means that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove an intention by the appellant to enter the intersection against the red light, nor to negative circumstances of honest and reasonable mistake of fact. 22. Even if the obligation was not absolute, in the circumstances of this case it was proved that the appellant did not have any reasonable excuse for entering the intersection contrary to the red light.  It is clear enough that it was the appellant’s own conduct which created the circumstance of him having to brake sharply in order to avoid a collision with the turning vehicle ahead of him. 23. The appellant admitted that he saw the traffic lights turn yellow.  At that time he was travelling at a speed of about 65 kph.  At that speed the appellant was travelling at 18 metres per second.  If he had maintained a constant speed of 65 kph, that means that the appellant would have travelled 75 metres from the moment when the lights turned yellow to the moment when the lights turned red.  That distance would have been a little less if the appellant was braking for part of the time.  However, as a matter of ordinary experience, the 4.21 seconds during which the lights were on yellow provided more than sufficient time in which the appellant could have brought his vehicle to a halt.  Furthermore, as already noted, the appellant’s vehicle had only just crossed the white stop line when the first photograph was taken, 1.9 seconds after the lights turned red.  The appellant, therefore, had also had part of the time during which the lights were showing red in which to bring his vehicle to a halt.  In these circumstances, the prosecution evidence, together with the appellant’s own evidence, negatived his claim that he had “no choice” but to enter the intersection after the lights had turned red."

• Director of Public Prosecutions v Mark Montaz Abouali [2011] NSWSC 110.

Qld Transport & Motoring

• 'Types of speed cameras and red light cameras' (Queensland Government) <https://www.qld.gov.au/transport/safety/fines/speed/cameras>, archived at <https://archive.is/KGcqw>: "Red light cameras are cameras located at intersections with traffic lights. These cameras take photos of vehicles that fail to stop at red lights. The cameras are usually attached to a pole or other infrastructure and placed a few meters back from the solid white line, which marks the start of the intersection. The photographic detection device is programmed to activate when a vehicle crosses the solid white stop line after the traffic light is red."

• 'Offences and penalities' in Your Keys to Driving in Queensland (Queensland Government, 19 November 2022) <https://www.publications.qld.gov.au/ckan-publications-attachments-prod/resources/39332e84-ed07-43f4-8801-86fe8eee2419/your-keys-to-driving-in-queensland-offences-penalties.pdf?ETag=ef6ad2368e8282064d33622ee875a1e8> 161: "Red light cameras are installed at intersections that have a history of crashes caused by red light running. The cameras operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. A red light camera is activated when the traffic light turns red. Any vehicle that crosses the STOP line and enters the intersection after the light has turned red will be photographed. After a vehicle is photographed, a second photograph is taken one second later. The second photograph is used to check whether the vehicle continued through the intersection or stopped just past the STOP line."

• 'Stopping Distances on Wet and Dry Roads' (Queensland Government) <https://www.qld.gov.au/transport/safety/road-safety/driving-safely/stopping-distances/graph>, archived at <https://archive.is/ojGoJ>: "40km/h 17m 9m 26m; 50km/h 21m 14m 35m;  60km/h 25m 20m 45m". 

• 'Stopping distances: speed and braking' (Queensland Government) <https://www.qld.gov.au/transport/safety/road-safety/driving-safely/stopping-distances>, archived at <https://archive.is/GVlku>. 

• Disputing a fine' (Queensland Government) <https://www.qld.gov.au/law/fines-and-penalties/disputing-a-fine>. 

• Traffic Regulations 1962 (Q) <https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/2024-08-09/sl-1962-tr>, red light cameras: 

> reg 209: "209 Operating and testing analogue redlight camera systems If an analogue redlight camera system is used to provide evidence of a prescribed offence, the following provisions must be complied with— (a) the system’s camera must be aimed so that an image made by the system shows— (i) the rear of a vehicle that is driven past the stop line for a traffic light or, if there is no stop line, the traffic light; and (ii) the stop line (if any) and the traffic light showing a red symbol; (b) the system’s induction loop must be installed in, on or under the road surface on either side of the stop line or traffic light; (c) the camera, the induction loop and traffic light must be linked so that—(i) after the traffic light changes to red and a programmed delay has elapsed, a vehicle passing over the induction loop activates the camera; and (ii) the activated camera captures at least 2 images of the vehicle, stop line (if any) and traffic light; and (iii) the camera is not activated unless the traffic light shows a red symbol; (d) each person who inserts into or removes a film magazine from the camera, or relocates the camera with a film magazine in place, must— (i) ensure that the camera is correctly positioned and aimed; and (ii) use the system’s testing mode (but by reference to green light cycles) to ensure that the camera and induction loop operate correctly as referred to in paragraph (c); and (iii) if a fault is indicated, take corrective action and repeat the testing process until no fault is indicated by the system in its testing mode; (e) if the tests or the film when developed indicate a fault has affected the proper operation of the system as required under this section, the film must be rejected for evidentiary purpose".

> reg 210B: "210B Operating and testing digital redlight camera systems (1) If a digital redlight camera system is used to provide evidence of a prescribed offence, the following provisions must be complied with— (a) the system’s camera must be aimed so that an image made by the system shows— (i) the front or rear of a vehicle that is driven past the stop line for a traffic light or, if there is no stop line, the traffic light; and (ii) the stop line (if any) and the traffic light showing a red symbol; (b) a component of the system that detects vehicles must be installed in a way that recognises when a vehicle passes the stop line or traffic light; (c) the system and traffic light must be linked so that— (i) after the traffic light changes to red and a programmed delay has elapsed, a vehicle passing the stop line or traffic light activates the camera; and (ii) the activated camera captures at least 2 images of the vehicle, stop line (if any) and traffic light; and (iii) the camera is not activated unless the traffic light shows a red symbol; (d) if a relevant event happens—the system must be tested in accordance with the specifications of the system’s manufacturer (but by reference to green light cycles) to ensure the system operates correctly; (e) if a fault is indicated in the system because of testing under paragraph (d)—corrective action must be taken and the testing must be repeated until no fault is indicated in the system; (f) if the tests or an image when viewed indicates a fault has affected the proper operation of the system as required under this section, the image must be rejected for evidentiary purposes. (2) Each of the following is a relevant event for subsection (1)(d)— (a) the installation of the digital redlight camera system; (b) the reinstallation, replacement or repair of camera system hardware for the system; Example— the replacement of the system’s camera (c) a change to the computer software used by the system. Example— the application of a software patch". 

> Interpretation of analogue images, glossary of terms, data blocks on image: See Schedule 11. 

> Interpretation of digital image, glossary of terms, data blocks on image: See Schedule 12.  

NZ Cases

• Taiupu v Police [2013] NZHC 2369 [name corrected, Tatupu v Police <https://justiceofthepeace.org.nz/modules/judicial%20studies%20module/resources/1-15-answers.pdf>] <https://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZHC/2013/2369.html>: "[5] Sergeant McGonigle produced four still photographs that he had obtained from the video camera footage. The first, which recorded a time of 20:15:07, showed the lights controlling Mr Tatupu’s vehicle to be yellow. The second still shot, timed at 20:15:11, showed the lights had turned red. The third shot, timed at 20:15:12 and also showing the lights red, showed Mr Tatupu’s vehicle about to enter the intersection. The fourth photograph, also timed at 20:15:12, showed the Nissan passing through the intersection. ... [15] Ms Stokes submitted that the question of whether, when the signal first appears, the vehicle is so close to the controlled area that it cannot safely be stopped before entering the area, is a subjective one. She relied on the following passage from the judgment of Goddard J in Kendall v Police:3 [16] Directly relevant to Mr Kendall’s belief that he entered the intersection on a  yellow light  and not a red light, is his view that he could not have safely stopped before the limit line once the light turned yellow and was therefore legally justified in proceeding through the intersection. Such situations, when they arise, are necessarily a matter of split-second judgement at the time and clearly contain an element of subjectivity. [16] In my respectful view, Goddard J was quite right to say that a driver confronted with a  yellow light  makes a split-second judgment that is subjective in nature. I very much doubt, however, that she intended to be understood as saying that the legal test of whether a vehicle can or cannot safely be stopped when a driver is faced by a  yellow light  is a subjective one. [17] The words of r 3.2(4)(a) clearly indicate otherwise. The rule is not directed to the state of mind of the driver but to whether the vehicle can safely be stopped. That plainly requires an objective evaluation, taking into account all of the circumstances bearing on the decision at the time it had to be made. They would include the speed of the vehicle, the distance between the vehicle and the controlled area when the  yellow light  first appears, road and driving conditions, and any other factors which could fairly and reasonably have a bearing on whether the vehicle can safely be stopped. [18] Ms Stokes complained that the Justices failed to give due weight to the reasons given by Mr Tatupu before deciding that he could not stop safely before the intersection. She said they failed to give reasons why they rejected his evidence and, in the absence of challenge, his belief must be accepted as genuinely held at the time. [19] In my view the Justices gave appropriate weight to Mr Tatupu’s stated reasons for acting as he did. They fairly reviewed the explanations he put forward, including his concern that his son could have suffered a whiplash injury. They directed themselves appropriately as to the critical issue, stating:4 [15] The issue for us is really down to what the road rule requires is [sic] that you stop unless it is unsafe for you to do so. You made a judgment call which you thought was reasonable. Obviously the police feel that in all the circumstances it was not a reasonable call and you should have stopped. [20] The Justices then concluded, on the basis already set out5 that, having regard to the time available to him, Mr Tatupu had a reasonable opportunity to stop and should have done so. That conclusion was clearly available to the Justices on the basis of incontrovertible evidence."

• Babbage v Police [2012] NZHC 3602 <https://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZHC/2012/3602.html>: "[11] The decision of the Justices gives rise to a real concern that they have simply misunderstood the legislation. I have set out above certain passages from their oral decision. In the first of them they say Mr Babbage did not deny the charge but rather claimed that he had insufficient time to brake. But of course that was his defence to the charge. The relevant Rule forbids a driver from entering a controlled area unless his or her vehicle is so close it cannot safely be stopped before entering the area. On the basis of that passage alone, it seems the Justices may have misunderstood the ingredients of the offence. [12] Second, I do not understand their reference to a police discretion, although on one reading and possibly the best reading, it seems they considered the police had a discretion in the circumstances to charge Mr Babbage with driving through a red light, because the light had turned red while he was still in the controlled area. [13] The passage concerned is somewhat confusing. Read alone it would not necessarily have given rise to the decision that I consider is inevitable, namely that the appeal must succeed. [14] The crunch passage is, however, the third extract which I have set out above. In it the Justices find that Mr Babbage was in breach when the  yellow light  was in front of him “ ... however short the distance might have been”. That is simply not right. If the Justices were correct, then there would be no need for the Rule to provide that it is a defence to a charge of this character that the vehicle could not safely be stopped before entering the controlled area at the time at which the yellow signal was first displayed."

• Court v Police [2013] NZHC 1466 <https://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZHC/2013/1466.html>: "[1] Mr Court appeals against a conviction that he failed to stop at a yellow traffic signal. The law is that – this is not a precise definition of it – where lights turn yellow you must stop if you are able to do so before entering the intersection. Drivers typically have to make judgments about  yellow lights , deciding whether they can stop or not. It is a combination of speed, weather conditions and traffic. ... [3] Constable Loh says he observed Mr Court’s gray van travelling on Moorhouse Avenue, in a straight lane. He observed the yellow signal, and he observed the gray van entering the intersection, and then the traffic light turning red just as or shortly after the gray van entered the intersection. It was the constable’s opinion that Mr Court had had an opportunity to stop while the lights were yellow, so that he did not need to enter the intersection. As it happened, Mr Court had to brake to avoid colliding with the white vehicle which had already been in the intersection, and which had initiated a U-turn with the lights changing. There is some issue as to whether that vehicle initiated a U-turn while the lights were yellow, or waited until the lights were red. [4] This was not Mr Court’s view of the facts. He was of the view that he did not have an opportunity to stop. That he had entered the intersection on the  yellow light , having judged he did not have the opportunity to stop. [5] The clash of evidence was examined by the Justices of the Peace. I have read the evidence-in-chief of Mr Loh, and the evidence-in-chief of a traffic engineer who explained that the  yellow lights  go on a four second phase, then they turn red, and after they have turned red for two seconds the lights the other way go green. [6] I have heard this matter in two hearings because I originally did not have the notes of evidence. I now have the notes of evidence. I read them before this hearing, and again examined them during the hearing. I respect Mr Court’s point of view. I accept him as a man who was telling the truth, as he saw it, before the Court and before me. This is one of those situations where the trial Judge, in this case the Justices of the Peace, had to make a decision on a conflict of evidence. The critical finding of the Justices of the Peace was: So having traversed all the evidence before us, we are of the opinion that you did have time or could have stopped before the intersection but did not, and entered the intersection on an orange or  yellow light  which changed, in the evidence of Mr Loh, within a fraction of a second after you entered. [7] On that finding of fact it was inevitable that there would be a breach, because the Court had before it evidence that that meant that the  yellow light  had been showing for almost four seconds before you entered the intersection."

• Speeding up, ?inference that it was safe to stop, bicycle: Kendall v Police [2013] NZHC 143 <https://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZHC/2013/143.html>: "[11] We have had considerable evidence presented to the Court. The defendant has agreed he sped up to get through the lights. At issue is whether the light was yellow or red. The defendant claims the light was yellow when he proceeded through the intersection and, whilst the defendant may have believed the light was still yellow, the evidence presented by the prosecution stated that it had changed to red. The further point that the defendant disputed was that the constable told him he had travelled through a  yellow light  and was issuing an infringement for that. However in the evidence given by Constable Garland, he did state that the information he had received from the observer was that the cycle had travelled through yellow and red lights. [12] The law is quite clear, and the defence and the prosecution agreed, a  yellow light  means you must stop unless it is unsafe to do so. The defendant stated it was unsafe for him to stop in the situation but instead chose to speed up and, on the evidence for the prosecution, we were told that this resulted in the defendant travelling through the intersection on a red light. ... [13] Mr Kendall, you stated yourself you were some 20 to 25 metres away when you chose to speed up and continue travelling through the intersection. We do find this matter proved beyond reasonable doubt. ... [16] Directly relevant to Mr Kendall’s belief that he entered the intersection on a  yellow light  and not a red light, is his view that he could not have safely stopped before the limit line once the light turned yellow and was therefore legally justified in proceeding through the intersection. Such situations, when they arise, are necessarily a matter of split-second judgement at the time and clearly contain an element of subjectivity. [17] Returning to the issue of distance and the estimated speed at which Mr Kendall was alleged to be travelling prior to entering the intersection, he submitted that on a simple calculation (which I note Sergeant Patterson agreed with under cross-examination) the light could not have turned to red before Mr Kendall entered the intersection, if he were travelling at approximately 50 kilometres an hour and was 30 metres or less from the intersection when the light turned to yellow. He put it to Sergeant Patterson that even if he had been travelling at a lesser speed, of say 40 kilometres an hour, he would have covered the estimated 30 metres well short of the four seconds a traffic light remains yellow. ... [27] It was the clarity and firmness of Sergeant Patterson’s evidence about his direct observations of Mr Kendall’s passage through the intersection itself, as exemplified in the following statement, which clearly impressed the Justices of the Peace: I’ve given the evidence of, of what I saw, my impression was that you were about 30 metres from the intersection when the light turned yellow, and that at that point you sped up, and then I observed you enter the intersection after the light had turned red, if my estimate of your distance or speed a little out, I can’t, I can’t comment on that, that was my impression of your speed and the distance you were from the light, but I can categorically say that it was light, it was red when you crossed the limit lines. ..."

• D v Police HC Wellington CRI-2008-485-139 [2009] NZHC 1690 <https://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZHC/2009/1690.html>: "[2] The essential issue on the appeal to this Court was whether the appellant could safely have stopped before he entered the intersection on which a  yellow light  was showing, in terms of reg 3.2(4)(a) of the Land Transport (Offences and Penalties) Regulations 1999. That was clearly a question of fact and no question of law arises. Necessarily, no question of law of general or public importance arises.". 

• Ioane v Police [2004] NZHC 1844 <https://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2004/1844.pdf>: "[6] ...  It is a matter of law that if a yellow light is showing, a person must stop unless they are so close to the intersection that they could not stop safely. But that was not the issue before the Justices — it was whether as a matter of fact, the light was red or yellow. That it was yellow was the defence presented by the appellant but rejected by the Justices in their decision. They accepted the constable’s evidence that the lights were definitely red. They believed that the officer gave a true picture of what happened and that the appellant proceeded through the intersection when the lights were red not yellow. If they accepted the officer’s evidence — as they did — it follows that her car was stationary for several seconds at the intersection which, in those circumstances, could only mean that the light was red. [7]  In the end the Justices’ decision came down to the question of credibility. They preferred the evidence of the police witness to that of the appellant and his sister. The officer was squarely confronted by the appellant in cross-examination, but there was evidence sufficient to entitle the Justices to conclude that the charge bad been established. Any alleged irregularities in the Justices failing to permit a witness to produce a Road Code were immaterial and did not affect the outcome. So too the failure to ask the appellant whether he wished to re-examine his witness did not lead to any miscarriage of justice. The witness could have added nothing or very little to that ‘which she had already given in direct evidence and in any event questions could only arise out of cross-examination.

[C] Red lights, Qld

• Byrne v Hulbert [2009] ACTSC 124: 

• Cullen v Queensland Police Service [2021] QDC 340: "7. The prosecution tendered two photographs accompanied by the relevant certificates which demonstrated that the appellant failed to stop at the red traffic arrow.  Those photographs demonstrated that at the time the appellant’s car reached the stop line, the traffic light had been red for 0.6 of a second and the second photograph showed the appellant’s car 1 second later having travelled past the stop line while the arrow was red.  8. The prosecution also called Stephen Kenneth Irvine who gave evidence that he was certain that the red-light camera on the date of the offence was operating correctly as it had passed its midnight self-test.  He also gave evidence that he had reviewed the camera in its entirety and found that it was operating correctly throughout the whole day. 9. In the context of the appellant’s primary complaint, being that he did not have enough time to proceed safely through the intersection, and that an amber light should stay on for 4 seconds rather than 3, Mr Irvine, importantly, gave evidence that the amber light at this set of traffic signals immediately prior to Mr Cullen travelling through the red arrow, had been active for 4.01 seconds.[3]  Similarly, the appellant cross-examined Mr Irvine and showed him a letter received from the Queensland Police Service which stated that drivers have a minimum of 3 seconds of an amber light to stop before the light changes to red.[4]  Mr Irvine gave evidence that that letter was referring to traffic signals generally, rather than this particular one.  He explained that the amount of seconds given on an amber light depends upon the speed limit on the road.  4 seconds is appropriate for a speed limit of 60kph.  In any case, this light had been amber for 4.01 seconds as Mr Cullen approached it. ... 17. The primary submission for the appellant at trial and on appeal appears to be that he was entitled to assume a certain number of vehicles could travel through the intersection and, in essence, that the lights were required to stay green for a period of time that gave drivers a fair chance to get through the intersection.  The difficulty with that submission is that it does not take into account the actions of other drivers.  For example, here there was evidence that the truck at the lead of the line of cars going through the intersection took off slowly and that the car in front of Mr Cullen braked whilst negotiating the corner. 18. Also, it seems to be submitted that there was something wrong with the sensors such that the light did not stay green for long enough.  There simply wasn’t any evidence at all as to how long the light stayed green.  Any evidence that there was dealing with what could have been a fault with the induction work, if it in fact related to the traffic lights, rather than the red-light camera, does not deal with the issue that there was evidence that the red-light camera was working correctly and uncontradicted evidence that the light had been amber for 4.1 seconds and then red for 0.6 of a second prior to Mr Cullen crossing the stop line. 19. The respondent submits in essence that any issue that there could be as to how long the traffic light was green for is irrelevant because it is uncontroversial that the appellant passed the white stop line after the traffic light had changed to red.  Further, as the respondent submits, while the issue as to the truck taking off late is strictly irrelevant to the issues surrounding the commission of the offence, it may provide some explanation consistent with there in fact being no issue with the traffic lights at all.  In other words, the combination of the truck taking off late and the car in front of the appellant braking, may have consumed most of the time that the light was green. ... 21. I have considered the evidence and submissions from both parties at trial and on appeal.  In my view, the learned Magistrate was perfectly entitled to accept that Mr Cullen failed to stop at the stop line on a red arrow.  Even if there were an issue as to the time the light was green, and I do not accept that there was, Mr Cullen crossed the stop line about 4.7 seconds after the light changed to amber. 22. The learned Magistrate was entitled to accept that there was in the circumstances, ample opportunity for Mr Cullen to stop. 23. In those circumstances, the learned Magistrate was entitled to reach a conclusion that the elements of the offence had been established beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly find Mr Cullen guilty of the offence.  I am unable to discern any error in the learned Magistrate’s approach."

> case appears to suggest that duration for which light remains amber varies - not standard, depending on applicable speed limit. 

[D] Red light Camera test records and service records, camera manual - Subpoena - Forensic Purpose: 

• Cai v The County Court of Victoria [2015] VSC 267: "Mr Cai produced no evidence nor provided any basis before the judge to suggest that the service records might materially assist his defence.  He speculated that they might.  That speculation did not provide a legitimate forensic purpose for the production of the documents.  No error of law or jurisdictional error appears in his Honour’s decision to set aside the two records subpoenas. 34. The challenge to his Honour’s decision in respect of the manual subpoena raises different issues. ... Mr Cai wanted to use the manual to seek legal and expert advice before the hearing of the appeal. ... Counsel for the third defendant by reference to the photographs and a diagram stated that there were inductive loops on lanes four and five of Springvale Road.  Mr Cai was in lane four immediately before he commenced his turn into Wellington Road.  Those loops detected the vehicle going across the intersection once the lights turned red.  The loops were on both sides of a line stretching across the intersection, which counsel contended marked the intersection, or at least, the commencement of the intersection . Mr Cai explained to his Honour that in order to present his defence he needed to know when the sensors commenced to operate; whether it was when the front of his vehicle touched the stop line or whether some other part of his vehicle, such as the back of the vehicle, could activate the camera and timer or clock.  These matters were relevant to when the camera and the annotation on the photograph identified his vehicle as having entered the intersection. Mr Cai relied on minimum guarantees contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly those relating to a fair hearing.  The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) also recognises the right of a person charged with a criminal offence to a fair hearing.[9] [9]          Section 24. Mr Cai described the technical manual as being a critical tool in order to advance technical detail of the TCO red light camera system to the Court. Before me, Mr Cai developed his reasons for seeking production of the manual to included his desire to obtain: (a)       details of how the camera operated; (b)      details of what part of the vehicle the sensor detected; (d)      details of what line the camera counted as the start of the intersection; (e)       details of what photos the camera took; (f)          details of why the camera calculated elapsed time without superimposing the time on the photo; (g)          details of the camera set up and outline of sensors, the gap between the sensors; (h)          details of the specific signal triggers and the e-file format; (i)          details of the onsite test service, reset trouble fix procedure. The third defendant, in submitting that Mr Cai’s amended originating motion should be dismissed, relied on the certificate of Mr Lai given under s 83A of the Act and the legislative policy that red light offences could be proved by certificate. The judgment of Beach J in Glare v Bolster[10] suggests that the legislative intent was to enable certificates under s 83A to have that effect. In written submissions, the third defendant submitted that Parliament intended traffic offences detected by a road safety camera to be proved without the need to call evidence related to all aspects of the operation of the cameras and instead provided for proof of the proper operation of the camera by tender of a certificate under s 83A of the Act. The certificate provided proof of the vehicle entering the intersection after the relevant light had turned red in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The third defendant contended that Mr Cai did not point to any facts to the judge upon which a reasonable possibility could be held that the specific road safety camera was not operating properly. Parliament’s intention was to provide an efficient method of proving road safety offences. [10]         (1993) 18 MVR 53, 65. In written submissions, the third defendant also relied on public interest immunity in answer to the production of documents pursuant to Mr Cai’s subpoenas, but no material was filed in support of that claim.  The third defendant expressed a general concern about possible misuse of documents produced pursuant to the subpoenas.  However, documents produced pursuant to subpoena are subject to an implied undertaking that they will only be used for the purpose of the proceeding. [11]  Breach of that undertaking may constitute a contempt of court. ... In my opinion, Mr Cai has established that the judge made an error of law on the face of the record by setting aside the manual subpoena. Mr Cai had stated a legitimate forensic purpose to justify production of the manual. The only issue in the proceeding was whether his vehicle entered the intersection against the red arrow. The informant relied on the certificate under s 83A, with its photographs and annotation of when Mr Cai’s vehicle entered the intersection. Mr Cai was entitled to produce evidence to the contrary. Mr Cai’s defence appear to be that the photographs and annotation erroneously record the time at which his vehicle entered into the intersection, as his vehicle had already entered the intersection before the change of traffic light to red.  Alternatively, he contended that that the photographs recorded the progress of parts of his vehicle after the front of his vehicle had entered the intersection.  Mr Cai’s defence to the charge may require him to establish what the annotation on the photograph meant.  The photographs do not appear to show the point of entry of Mr Cai’s vehicle into the intersection.  Nor is there an indication of what information the annotation on the photograph conveys when it states ‘when the vehicle entered in the intersection’ that 2.2 seconds had elapsed since the lights turned red. The judge proceeded on the basis that Mr Cai wanted to know whether the sensors were working properly.  That would have been a fishing expedition.  However, Mr Cai indicated that he was attempting to establish a different point.  He wanted to establish the point at which the photograph, the camera and the time clock treated his vehicle as having first entered the intersection, in order to challenge  the 2.2 second time elapse annotation contained on the photograph. I consider, with respect, that his Honour did not identify or consider the basis on which Mr Cai argued that he had a legitimate forensic purpose for issuing the manual subpoena.  There was, of course, no definite proof that the contents of the manual would assist his case, but as Gibbs CJ stated in Alister v R:[12] Although a mere “fishing” expedition can never be allowed, it may be enough that it appears to be “on the cards” that the documents will materially assist the defence. [12]         (1984) 154 CLR 404, 414. His Honour applied the applicable legal principle of legitimate forensic purpose.  However, I consider, with respect, that his Honour did not address the relevant questions and issues raised by Mr Cai’s statement of his purpose for issuing the manual subpoena and made an error of law in the sense discussed in the passage that I have quoted from Craig v State of South Australia.[13] [13]         (1995) 184 CLR 163. That error of law appeared in his Honour’s reasons and therefore on the face of the record. I consider that an order in the nature of  certiorari should issue to quash that part of his Honour’s order of 24 June 2014 that set aside the subpoena directed to the ‘Traffic Camera Office (Michelle Corbett)’.[14] I will also issue an order in the nature of mandamus remitting that subpoena to the judge who made the orders on 24 June 2014, or another judge, to be dealt with according to law and in accordance with these reasons. That judge can extend the time for the return of the subpoena and for the production of the manual to the County Court."

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